package middleware

import (
	"cmp"
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/binary"
	"encoding/hex"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"git.avsdev.uk/Go/job-search/internal/config"
	"git.avsdev.uk/Go/job-search/internal/httpx"
)

// Errors returned by CSRF.Validate for a token that is rejected.
var (
	// ErrCSRFMissing is returned when no token is presented.
	ErrCSRFMissing = errors.New("csrf token missing")
	// ErrCSRFNoCookie is returned when the request has no CSRF cookie.
	ErrCSRFNoCookie = errors.New("csrf cookie missing")
	// ErrCSRFMismatch is returned when the token differs from the cookie.
	ErrCSRFMismatch = errors.New("csrf token does not match cookie")
	// ErrCSRFInvalid is returned for a malformed token or a bad signature.
	ErrCSRFInvalid = errors.New("csrf token invalid")
	// ErrCSRFExpired is returned for a token older than the token TTL.
	ErrCSRFExpired = errors.New("csrf token expired")
)

// CSRF implements two independent layers:
//
//  1. http.CrossOriginProtection (Go >=1.25): rejects unsafe cross-origin
//     browser requests using Sec-Fetch-Site, falling back to Origin vs Host.
//  2. Signed double-submit token: an HttpOnly cookie plus the same value in a
//     request header. The value is HMAC-signed and timestamped, so an
//     attacker who can plant cookies (e.g. from a sibling subdomain) still
//     cannot mint a valid token. This layer also covers requests that carry
//     neither Sec-Fetch-Site nor Origin.
//
// A token can be obtained with GET /api/csrf and sent in the header for API
// consumers.
type CSRF struct {
	cop        *http.CrossOriginProtection
	token      bool
	key        []byte
	cookieName string
	headerName string
	ttl        time.Duration
	exempt     *http.ServeMux
}

// The defaults NewCSRF uses for an empty cookie or header name, or a token
// TTL of 0 or less, as the configuration's defaults.
const (
	// defaultCSRFCookieName is the cookie the token is set in.
	defaultCSRFCookieName = "js_csrf"
	// defaultCSRFHeaderName is the request header that carries the token.
	defaultCSRFHeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
	// defaultCSRFTokenTTL is how long a token is valid.
	defaultCSRFTokenTTL = 12 * time.Hour
)

// Sizes of a token's parts.
const (
	// csrfNonceLen is the size of a token's random nonce.
	csrfNonceLen = 16
	// csrfPayloadLen is the size of a token's signed payload: the nonce and
	// the time it was issued (unix seconds).
	csrfPayloadLen = csrfNonceLen + 8
)

// NewCSRF builds the CSRF layers from conf. Without a configured key, tokens
// are signed with a random key for this process, and a warning is logged if
// tokens are enabled. It logs to slog.Default() unless given WithLogger.
func NewCSRF(conf config.JSCServerCSRF, opts ...Option) (*CSRF, error) {
	csrf := &CSRF{
		token:      conf.Tokens.Enabled,
		cookieName: cmp.Or(conf.Tokens.CookieName, defaultCSRFCookieName),
		headerName: http.CanonicalHeaderKey(
			cmp.Or(conf.Tokens.HeaderName, defaultCSRFHeaderName),
		),
		ttl:    conf.Tokens.TokenTTL,
		exempt: http.NewServeMux(),
	}
	if csrf.ttl <= 0 {
		csrf.ttl = defaultCSRFTokenTTL
	}

	if conf.Tokens.Key != "" {
		key, err := hex.DecodeString(conf.Tokens.Key)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("csrf key: %w", err)
		}
		csrf.key = key
	} else {
		csrf.key = make([]byte, 32)
		rand.Read(csrf.key) // crypto/rand.Read never returns an error
		if conf.Tokens.Enabled {
			applyOptions(opts).logger("csrf").Warn(
				"csrf key not set; using a random per-process key, so tokens " +
					"won't survive a restart or be valid across instances",
			)
		}
	}

	noop := http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
	})
	for _, pattern := range conf.ExemptPaths {
		csrf.exempt.Handle(pattern, noop)
	}

	if conf.CrossOriginProtection.Enabled {
		csrf.cop = http.NewCrossOriginProtection()
		for _, origin := range conf.CrossOriginProtection.TrustedOrigins {
			if err := csrf.cop.AddTrustedOrigin(origin); err != nil {
				return nil, fmt.Errorf("csrf trusted origin %q: %w", origin, err)
			}
		}
		for _, pattern := range conf.ExemptPaths {
			csrf.cop.AddInsecureBypassPattern(pattern)
		}
		csrf.cop.SetDenyHandler(http.HandlerFunc(
			func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
				httpx.WriteProblem(
					w, r, http.StatusForbidden, "cross-origin request rejected",
				)
			},
		))
	}

	return csrf, nil
}

// HeaderName is the request header that must carry the token.
func (c *CSRF) HeaderName() string { return c.headerName }

// TokenEnabled reports whether the token layer is active.
func (c *CSRF) TokenEnabled() bool { return c.token }

// Protect applies both layers to unsafe methods, except on exempt paths.
func (c *CSRF) Protect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		if c.token && !isSafeMethod(r.Method) && !c.isExempt(r) {
			if err := c.Validate(r, r.Header.Get(c.headerName)); err != nil {
				httpx.WriteProblem(w, r, http.StatusForbidden, err.Error())
				return
			}
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})

	if c.cop != nil {
		return c.cop.Handler(handler)
	}

	return handler
}

// Validate checks a presented token against the cookie and its signature.
func (c *CSRF) Validate(r *http.Request, presented string) error {
	if presented == "" {
		return ErrCSRFMissing
	}

	cookie, err := r.Cookie(c.cookieNameFor(IsSecure(r)))
	if err != nil || cookie.Value == "" {
		return ErrCSRFNoCookie
	}

	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(cookie.Value), []byte(presented)) != 1 {
		return ErrCSRFMismatch
	}

	issued, err := c.verify(presented)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	if time.Since(issued) > c.ttl {
		return ErrCSRFExpired
	}

	return nil
}

// IssueHandler serves GET /api/csrf: it (re)issues the cookie and returns
// the token for the client to echo back in the header. A still-fresh token
// is reused so parallel tabs do not invalidate each other.
func (c *CSRF) IssueHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	secure := IsSecure(r)
	name := c.cookieNameFor(secure)

	token := ""
	issued := time.Time{}
	if cookie, err := r.Cookie(name); err == nil {
		cookieIssued, err := c.verify(cookie.Value)
		if err == nil && time.Since(cookieIssued) < c.ttl/2 {
			token, issued = cookie.Value, cookieIssued
		}
	}

	if token == "" {
		issued = time.Now()
		token = c.mint(issued)
		// Secure is false only on plain HTTP (local development), where
		// browsers refuse Secure cookies; HttpOnly and SameSite are always set.
		http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{ //nolint:gosec // G124: see above
			Name:     name,
			Value:    token,
			Path:     "/",
			MaxAge:   int(c.ttl.Seconds()),
			HttpOnly: true,
			Secure:   secure,
			SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
		})
	}

	httpx.WriteJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
		"token":     token,
		"header":    c.headerName,
		"expiresAt": issued.Add(c.ttl).UTC(),
	})
}

// mint returns a new token issued at now: a random nonce and the issue time,
// and their signature (see sign), each base64url encoded and joined by ".".
func (c *CSRF) mint(now time.Time) string {
	payload := make([]byte, csrfPayloadLen)
	rand.Read(payload[:csrfNonceLen]) // crypto/rand.Read never returns an error

	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(
		payload[csrfNonceLen:],
		uint64(now.Unix()), //nolint:gosec // G115: the current time is after 1970
	)

	encoding := base64.RawURLEncoding

	return encoding.EncodeToString(payload) + "." +
		encoding.EncodeToString(c.sign(payload))
}

// verify checks token's format and signature and returns when it was issued,
// or ErrCSRFInvalid.
func (c *CSRF) verify(token string) (time.Time, error) {
	encodedPayload, encodedSignature, ok := strings.Cut(token, ".")
	if !ok {
		return time.Time{}, ErrCSRFInvalid
	}

	encoding := base64.RawURLEncoding
	payload, payloadErr := encoding.DecodeString(encodedPayload)
	signature, signatureErr := encoding.DecodeString(encodedSignature)
	if payloadErr != nil || signatureErr != nil ||
		len(payload) != csrfPayloadLen {
		return time.Time{}, ErrCSRFInvalid
	}

	if !hmac.Equal(signature, c.sign(payload)) {
		return time.Time{}, ErrCSRFInvalid
	}

	issuedUnix := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[csrfNonceLen:])
	// The payload is signed, so this is a time mint wrote: after 1970.
	return time.Unix(int64(issuedUnix), 0), nil //nolint:gosec // G115: see above
}

// sign returns the HMAC-SHA256 of payload under the CSRF key.
func (c *CSRF) sign(payload []byte) []byte {
	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, c.key)
	mac.Write([]byte("csrf-v1|"))
	mac.Write(payload)

	return mac.Sum(nil)
}

// cookieNameFor drops the __Host-/__Secure- prefix on plain HTTP (local
// development), because browsers refuse such cookies without Secure.
func (c *CSRF) cookieNameFor(secure bool) string {
	if secure {
		return c.cookieName
	}
	name := strings.TrimPrefix(c.cookieName, "__Host-")
	return strings.TrimPrefix(name, "__Secure-")
}

// isExempt reports whether r's path matches one of the exempt paths.
func (c *CSRF) isExempt(r *http.Request) bool {
	_, pattern := c.exempt.Handler(r)
	return pattern != ""
}

// isSafeMethod reports whether method is safe (it changes nothing), so
// needs no CSRF protection.
func isSafeMethod(method string) bool {
	return method == http.MethodGet || method == http.MethodHead ||
		method == http.MethodOptions
}